Introduction
The migration of large flows of persons across national boundaries has been an important component of demographic change since Biblical times. International differences in economic and political conditions remain sufficiently strong to encourage the flows of millions of persons across countries. United Nations statistics, for example, show that nearly 5 million persons migrated to a different country in the 1975-1980 period. l The national origin of these persons exhibits a substantial variance: practically every country in the world contributes to the pool of persons who believe that better opportunities exist elsewhere and who are willing to incur the costs necessary to experience those opportunities. On the other hand, these peregrinators tend to migrate to only a handful of destination countries. In particular, about two-thirds of all immigrants in the 1975-1980 period migrated to one of three countries: Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Of course, each of these three countries is characterized by a long history of immigration. Table 1. 1, for example, shows that the percentage of the population that is foreign-born in each of these three host countries has been large throughout the 20th century. In 1910, 14 percent of the U.S. population, 22 percent of the Canadian population, and 18 percent of the Australian population were foreign-born. By 1980 the U.S. share of foreign-born persons in the population had declined to 6.2 percent, the Canadian share had declined to 15.9 percent, and the Australian share had increased to 20.6 percent. Immigration still remains an important component of demographic change in these three "magnet" countries. 2
The numerical (and economic) importance of the immigrant popu lation in the labor markets in each of these host countries has renewed interest among economists in the old question of how immigrants do in the labor market of the receiving country. Most of this research has focused on the American experience, although a few similar studies have also been conducted using Canadian or Australian census data. 3 This literature, for the most part, compares the earnings of immigrants to the earnings of natives in one of the host countries and makes inferences about the degree of adaptation or "assimilation" of the immigrant population in that country based on those comparisons.
The early studies in this literature used a single cross-section data set (such as the 1970 U.S. Census of Population) to compare immigrant earnings to the earnings of natives. These cross-sectional studies of immigrant earnings revealed two remarkable empirical findings: (1) the age/earnings profile of immigrants was significantly steeper than the age/earnings profile of "comparable" natives (i.e., natives with the same education and other socioeconomic characteristics as immi grants); and (2) although immigrant earnings were smaller than the earnings of comparable natives in the first few years after the migration took place, within 10-15 years the earnings of immigrants "caught up" and surpassed the earnings of comparable natives. Hence for a significant fraction of the working life cycle, immigrants earned substantially more than comparable natives.
The first of these findings was interpreted in the context of the human capital framework. Since the slope of an earnings profile (i.e., the rate at which earnings grow as the individual ages), by assumption, measures the extent to which such human capital investments as education, on-the-job training, etc., are taking place, the finding that immigrant earnings rose at a faster rate than native earnings must imply that immigrants invest more in human capital than natives. In fact, it seems quite plausible to argue that as immigrants learn the language and culture and gain information about the U.S. labor market and where the best-paying jobs are located, some "catching-up" of immigrant earnings to native earnings is inevitable.
The second of the empirical findings in cross-section studies (namely, that immigrant earnings "overtake" the earnings of compa rable natives) is not entirely consistent with the human capital framework. There is, in theory, no reason why immigrants would want to accumulate more human capital than comparable natives. Hence the explanation of this empirical result lies in the hypothesis that immi grants must have brought with them a sizable amount of unobserved human capital (the human capital must be unobserved since earnings are being compared between immigrants and natives of the same education and socioeconomic characteristics). This explanation, in effect, assumes that immigrants are in some sense more driven and more motivated than natives, and hence it is not surprising that, given the chance, immigrants are more successful than natives in the U.S. labor market. The overtaking result is thus explained by assuming the existence of an unobserved ability differential between immigrants and natives. This ability differential may arise because immigrants are a nonrandom sample of the population from the countries of origin, and because the migration decision led to the self-selection of individuals who have a little more initiative, drive, and motivation than the average person in the population of the host country.
Recently, a "second-generation" phase of the literature has devel oped. These studies raise important questions and doubts about both the methodology used in the early cross-section analyses, and about the validity of the economic and selection assumptions used in explaining the results. The more recent studies begin with the observation that a single cross-section regression of earnings on age (or years-sincemigration) confounds two important effects: the impact of pure aging on earnings growth, and the fact that different immigrant cohorts may differ substantially in productivity or quality. In other words, the observation that earnings and years-since-migration are strongly and positively correlated could be due to the fact that immigrants assimilate quickly, or to the fact that earlier immigrant waves are more productive than the more recent immigrant waves. Since regressions estimated in a single cross-section of data cannot separately identify aging and cohort effects, the recent literature analyzes the earnings of immigrants using either longitudinal data (Borjas 1987b; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1985) or using a series of cross-sections (such as the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses) to "track" specific cohorts of immigrants over time (see Beggs and Chapman 1987; Bloom and Gunderson 1987; and Borjas 1985) .
Although these studies use different data sets collected in different host countries, a single theme seems to be emerging from the recent literature: analyses of immigrant earnings that use a single cross-section of data provide a seriously flawed view of the assimilation process. For example, in contrast to findings of rapid earnings growth for the firstgeneration immigrant population, the "second-generation" studies find very small rates of earnings growth, so that immigrant "assimilation" is a relatively weak phenomenon in the labor market, and overtaking is almost never observed for the more recent immigrant waves. In addition, these studies find that different waves of immigrants (even from the same country of origin) differ significantly in their earnings capacities. Borjas (1985) , for example, documents that the more recent waves of immigrants arriving in the United States have significantly lower earnings capacities than the waves of immigrants who arrived 10 or 20 years earlier. These various findings thus suggest that the typical cross-section correlation between immigrant earnings and years-sincemigration is mainly attributable to the fact the cohort effects are im portant, and not to the existence of strong assimilation rates in the first-generation, foreign-born population.
Despite the recent substantive advances in the literature, these studies (like the first-generation studies that preceded them) implicitly present an extremely myopic view of the immigration experience. Due to the construction of the available data sets, all that seems to matter in this literature is the comparison of immigrant earnings in the country of destination with the earnings of natives in that country. This myopic view ignores the fact that persons emigrating any country of origin usually have more than one potential country of destination. In a sense, potential migrants enter an "immigration market" where different host countries reveal the costs and benefits of emigrating to each particular country, and individuals then make a decision whether to emigrate or not, and which country to migrate to, based on these comparisons. The analysis presented in this monograph incorporates the idea of an "immigration market©© by focusing on a comparative study of the labor market performance of immigrants in each of the three main host countries in the postwar period, Australia, Canada, and the United States. The existence of an immigration market suggests that the distribution of foreign-born persons across these three countries is not random. This nonrandom sorting raises important questions about the kinds of self-selection biases that are generated by the endogenous migration decision of individuals.
The size of the flows generated by the self-selection of migrants into each of the three potential countries of destination is documented in table 1.2. Over the 1959-1981 period, over 14.7 million persons left the various countries of origin and migrated to Australia, Canada, or the United States. Sixty-one percent of these migrants chose the United States as their destination, and the remainder were split between Australia and Canada. Table 1 .2 also shows, however, that these statistics vary significantly between the early part of the period (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) and the later part of the period (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . Recent migrants are disproportionately more likely to select the U.S. as their destination (nearly two-thirds of migrants in the 1970s did so), and disproportionately less likely to choose Australia as their destination (only 14 percent did so). Table 1 .2 also shows that these aggregate statistics mask important country-of-origin differences. During the 1971-1981 period, the United States was less likely to receive immigrants from Africa, the United Kingdom, Europe and Oceania, and significantly more likely to receive immigrants from Asia and North and South America. Canada, on the other hand, seemed a relatively attractive destination for This monograph presents an empirical analysis of the labor market performance of the foreign-born population in each of these three countries of destination. Its main objective is to ascertain the impact of the endogenous migration decision on the quality of the immigrant flows reaching each of the countries. The analysis will be guided by two important conceptual tools: the existence of an immigration market and the hypothesis that individuals are wealth-maximizers. These two tools suggest that individuals enter an immigration market where various countries give "wage offers" to potential migrants, and that individuals then migrate to or stay in the country that has the highest wage offer (net of migration costs). It will be seen that this conceptual framework provides a very useful method for analyzing the nonrandom nature of the sorting of immigrants across host countries.
The empirical analysis below provides a joint study of five censuses conducted in the three host countries since 1970: the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses, the 1971 and 1981 Canadian Censuses, and the 1981 Australia Census. It will be seen that the systematic study of international differences in the relative performance of immigrants in the labor market provides substantive insight into the self-selection process that determines the composition of the pool of migrants. In addition, the empirical analysis illustrates the importance of changes in immigration policy in determining both the national origin and skill composition of the migrant flow reaching a particular country of destination.
NOTES
©These statistics are obtained from United Nations (1982, p. 44) . The calculations discussed in the text ignore the large (and presumably temporary) population flows from Ethiopia to Somalia in the late 1970s, as well as the movement of guest workers to oil producing countries in the Middle East.
2See Borjas and Tienda (1987) for a discussion of the contribution of immigration to demographic change in the United States. A broader, historical account of the role
